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REACHING THE UNREACHED: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
THIS PAPER DESCRIBES how large scale rural water supply
and sanitation projects can be scaled up and sustained
using a demand based approach in order to reach the
unreached in the 21st Century.
Introduction
Despite the growing level of investment in water and
sanitation over the past decade, an increasing number of
people lack access to adequate water and sanitation serv-
ices in rural and peri-urban areas. While experience dem-
onstrates that no fixed formula works, the direction that
should be taken to improve service delivery has become
more clear. A set of principles has emerged that provides
the framework for delivering improved services on a
sustainable basis.
Based on these principals a new approach to project
design and implementation can be adopted that encour-
ages governments and implementing agencies to apply
more consistent rules and policies than in the past. It is
also becoming clear that the building of systematic learn-
ing component into projects which aim to continually
improve the delivery of rural water and sanitation serv-
ices within projects are an important tool in this new
approach.
The traditional approach
Experience has clearly demonstrated that rules which
favor highly centralized decision-making about service
allocations and the level and intensity of local demands
have not produced either efficient or sustainable services.
Many large investments were based exclusively on tech-
nical merits and did not fully respond to what the tar-
geted communities wanted. Examples of such traditional
rules that have not worked well include:
• The selection of communities to be served by planners
on the basis of external determination of “need” for
service, rather than economic “demand” for service.
• The selection of levels of service to be provided (and
by implication, technologies to be employed) based
on “affordability”, rather than on “willingness to pay”.
• The provision of the prescribed service level on a grant
basis without procedures to negotiate with the se-
lected communities on cost-sharing arrangements,
which may differ from a uniform allocation of such
responsibilities.
• The extensive involvement of government personnel,
rather than local decision-makers, in decisions re-
garding the location, construction, operation, and
maintenance of community facilities.
There are now numerous examples of projects which
have successfully modified some of these traditional
institutional rules with positive effects.
The new approach
The new approach to RWSS is based primarily on two of
the principles that were developed by the Nordic donor
community and endorsed at the 1992 International Con-
ference on Water and the Environment in Dublin. These
principles emerged at the end of the International Drink-
ing Water Supply & Sanitation Decade when the sector
began to agree that projects must focus to a greater extent
on demand and sustainability. They are:
• Water is an economic as well as a social good and
should be managed as such.
• Water should be managed at the lowest appropriate
level, with users involved in the planning and imple-
mentation of projects.
These principles have broad implications for water
resources management and development in general.
Managing water as an economic good requires careful
attention to issues related to the allocation of water among
users and to the principles that should guide allocation,
for example, between urban and rural areas or between
the water supply and irrigation sectors. It is essential that
the principles are considered in decisions about the use of
public and private funds as well when investing in rural
development.
Managing water as an economic good also implies that
projects must be designed to provide incentives for the
efficient and effective use of facilities. There must be a
balance between the economic value of water to users, the
cost of providing services to users, and the prices charged
for these services. Typically, in RWSS projects, these
elements are not in balance. The government usually
determines the cost of providing services through the
technical options it offers, and it also sets the prices
charged to users. But this price does not necessarily
correspond to the value that users attach to the service or
to the cost of providing services.
To achieve water uses and investments in which the value
that people (the users) attach to a given service is greater than
the cost, and consequently, is a service for which they are willing
to pay.
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In order to manage water at the lowest appropriate
level, criteria must be developed to determine what that
level is for different activities. The most robust criterion
appears to be that major management decisions should be
made at a level that encompasses, but does not go beyond,
the range of demands being addressed. In other words, a
decision should not be made at a higher level, if it can be
made effectively at a lower level.
In RWSS projects, demands for community water sup-
ply and sanitation services are localized demands. There-
fore, managerial decisions about levels of service, loca-
tions of facilities, and cost-sharing should be made locally
as well. The main role of higher-level government agen-
cies should be to establish institutional rules, regulations,
and processes that encourage such local decisions.
Translating principles into action
Translating these principles into action requires that project
planners establish rules and procedures that encourage
efficient and effective choices, permit valid inferences
about the level and intensity of local demands, and re-
duce transaction costs. An increasing number of projects
financed by the World Bank and other external support
agencies (ESAs) are applying these principles as a means
to create incentives that encourage demand-responsive
services. Four broad and inter-related rules have been
identified.
• Eligibility criteria: Eligibility rules for participation
should be broad enough so that eligibility does not, by
itself, guarantee that every eligible community will
receive service during a particular time period. Serv-
ices should follow, not precede, community initiative
in seeking the improvement.
• Technical options and service levels: Communities
should be actively involved in selecting service levels.
A range of technical options and service levels should
be offered to communities, and their related cost
implications made clear.
• Cost-sharing arrangements: The basic principles of
cost-sharing should be specified and community re-
sponsibility for costs (capital and operation and main-
tenance costs) made clear from the outset. These prin-
ciples should aim at negotiated cost-sharing arrange-
ments in which the local community chooses the
levels of service for which it is willing to pay.
• Responsibility for investment support: Particular
emphasis should be placed on responsibility for the
sustainability of investments. Rules should be set
regarding asset ownership, operations and mainte-
nance, and the recovery of system costs.
Projects must design operational procedures that offer
alternatives for community support. The local commu-
nity should be able to choose who assists them with
proposal preparation, construction of facilities, and op-
erations and maintenance (O&M). The role of intermedia-
tion is recognized in order to disseminate rules and
information to guide community decision-making. Ad-
ministrative procedures must encourage efficiency in
service delivery. The cost-sharing arrangements should
also be made clear prior to the decision by the community.
A project’s long-term success depends on adherence to
a clear set of rules and procedures that create proper
incentives. For example, rules about levels of service and
financial policies should be such that communities con-
tribute enough to the project to have a stake in getting the
service they want, knowing full well the cost implications
of sustaining this service. Although the rules provide a
framework for all activities, the project should be de-
signed so that lessons from earlier project phases can be
fed back into subsequent phases of the project. This
adaptive project design requires continuous review and
modification throughout planning and implementation
and is critical to the improved performance of the project
and investment sustainability.
Moreover, project rules must provide incentives for
appropriate behavior. The main project stakeholders must
be actively involved in developing the rules and be com-
mitted to their enforcement. The best set of rules is the
simplest:transparent and not subject to interpretation.
The fewer the rules, the better, as long as they are inter-
nally coherent and promote desired behavior. Rules must
be widely disseminated, understood by all, and consist-
ently applied by stakeholders. It is essential that sector
policy supports the rules on a national level.
Applying the rules
In the late 1980s, the UNDP/World Bank Water and
Sanitation Program assisted with the implementation of
a series of RWSS pilot projects, in countries such as
Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, and Pakistan. These projects
were designed to test financial, institutional, social, and
technical interventions at the community level. In recent
years, the Program has worked with governments, ben-
eficiaries, NGOs, the World Bank, and other ESAs to
incorporate lessons into the design of large investments.
The program currently supports RWSS initiatives in 20
countries and large World Bank-funded projects in 15 of
these countries. The Program’s experience with RWSS
has shown that project planners are applying the rules as
a means to encourage demand-driven investments. De-
scribed below are the results of a survey on how the rules
are being applied in recent projects with Program in-
volvement (reference).
Eligibility criteria for participation
Demand-driven projects must ensure that communities
are not being selected based only on need, but that com-
munities take the initiative to improve their services. The
idea is that project planners should not prepare lists of
communities that should be served, but rather set eligibil-
ity rules on how communities can become eligible for
services. The eligibility rules should allow more commu-
nities to be eligible than can be served, and then prioritize
communities based on expressed demand.
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All of the surveyed projects have eligibility criteria
requiring communities that request services to contribute
to the costs and assume responsibility for long-term O&M.
However, there is still substantial confusion between
eligibility criteria based on need and criteria based on
demand. Need-based criteria include health and poverty
indicators, infant mortality, water scarcity, water quality,
and distance to source. Other examples of eligibility
criteria are back-stopping by local government, develop-
ment potential of the community, and participation in
other project components. These criteria can be used by
governments to choose the geographical regions that will
be served first, as long as communities that are selected
have shown evidence of their demand.
Once eligibility has been established, prioritization cri-
teria will determine which communities get served first
among those that have clearly expressed a demand. For
example, a large RWSS project in Bolivia established the
following prioritization criteria: first come, first served;
communities who agree to pay a higher percentage of
costs; and areas where the municipal government co-
sponsors investments and there is a critical mass of com-
munities. This critical mass will help achieve economies
of scale and lower costs.
Technical options and service levels
Technology options and levels of service are integral
elements of the new approach. They directly relate to the
choices communities make about the services they want
and for which they are willing to pay. Although most
project designs now offer a range of technical options to
communities for water supply provision, many projects
still do not fully allow communities to chose their preferred
technical option or have promotional campaigns favoring
certain options. Examples of this situation can be found in
projects in Mali, India, and the Philippines. This under-
scores the importance of training intermediaries and project
staff in demand-based approaches and developing meth-
odologies for negotiating service levels with communities.
Service levels are closely linked to the project’s financial
policy and are usually defined by the amount of water
that will be provided and the proximity to the house. A
demand-based approach requires that communities
choose their preferred service level based on their willing-
ness to pay. However, many projects influence this deci-
sion by offering higher levels of subsidy for the technical
options that they want to promote. This situation most
frequently occurs for piped water systems (pumped or
gravity), and rarely for boreholes fitted with handpumps.
In piped systems, projects often provide high subsidies
for public standpipes, but require beneficiaries to fund
house connections, as is the case in Ecuador. In sanitation,
less than one-third of the projects offer higher levels of
service than latrines, although most projects allow benefi-
ciaries to chose between a VIP and a pour-flush latrine.
Preliminary indications are that communities often want,
and are willing to pay for higher levels of service.
Many projects have adopted technical standards into
their design. In projects in Ghana, Philippines, and Ecua-
dor, technical standards coincide with those established
by government, but in Bolivia they have been adopted as
national standards as a result of the project. Other projects
have developed standards independently as in Indonesia
and Nepal. In projects where new standards have been
prepared, they have replaced the “over-designed, urban-
biased” standards of the past, and closely approximate
rural reality (for example, water consumption rates of 20-
50 liters per capita per day). They also promote the use of
low-cost technology. When adequately designed, stand-
ards have a positive impact on quality, design, and invest-
ment costs. However, standards can also have a negative
impact by limiting technological innovation and, there-
fore, cost reductions.
Cost sharing arrangements
Most surveyed projects require beneficiary contributions
to capital costs, even for a minimal level of service.
Contributions may be in cash, kind, or both. Two alterna-
tive approaches have been used in defining cost-sharing
arrangements: (1) a subsidy defined as a percent of the
investment cost, and (2) an established subsidy ceiling.
Subsidy as percentage of investment cost: Approxi-
mately half of the surveyed projects require communities
to make a percent contribution to project costs, but have
no established investment ceiling. This is the case in
projects in Mali, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Philippines, and Sri
Lanka. Contributions are typically quite low, ranging
from 8 percent to 20 percent of investment costs, and often
provided in kind. Because the contribution is relatively
small, this policy provides little incentive for the user to
push for lower investment costs.
The question remains whether such a relatively small
contribution does in fact demonstrate an economic de-
mand for the services. Communities have found it diffi-
cult to fully understand this policy, as percentages mean
little unless converted to real terms. It is not clear if the
community financial contribution is sufficiently high to
influence decisions. This policy also raises equity issues,
as communities may receive a different level of subsidy
depending on the costs of the technologies chosen.
Ceiling imposed on subsidized amount:  All projects
that apply a ceiling to the amount of government subsidy
require communities to contribute a percentage of the
investment cost up to the ceiling, and cover full costs
above the ceiling. Ceilings are determined in two ways: as
a defined minimum level of service or in real terms as a
cash value.
Defined as level of service: Governments will subsidize
a percentage of the investment cost up to a “minimum”
level of service. Above this level, communities must pay
full costs. Projects in Ecuador, India, and Nepal have
established financial policies based on this concept. Al-
though this policy forces communities to make a choice,
it allows a high degree of subjectivity in defining the basic
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level of service and does not always produce the most
efficient solutions.
In real terms: Government defines its contribution as a
fixed amount of money, regardless of the level of service
chosen. This is the policy in projects in Bolivia and Indo-
nesia. If the subsidy ceiling is sufficiently low, communi-
ties must make financial choices about service levels.
Therefore, this policy provides the best incentive for the
communities to make choices and influence costs. How-
ever, setting the initial ceiling can be arduous and re-
quires commitment to its enforcement by all project
stakeholders.
A standard subsidy ceiling adopted at the country level
as national policy has two benefits. First, without a ceiling
on the subsidy provided by government, there is a risk of
financing very costly projects with high investment costs
per capital while the same resources could finance projects
with lower investment costs and benefit a much larger
number of people. Second, governments only subsidize a
basic level of service, and communities must bear the
additional costs of the project above this level.
Responsibility for investment
sustainability
Although most projects require communities to assume
responsibility for O&M, the majority of projects still do
not transfer system ownership to the communities as a
matter of government policy. Even when state govern-
ments retain legal ownership of the water system, com-
munities remain responsible for system management. It
is not clear if projects are moving towards community
management because governments no longer want to
assume responsibility for these services, or because of the
belief that management should occur at the lowest appro-
priate level.
Given the distortions created by high levels of subsidy
in the sector, it is important to determine if the demand
expressed by communities through the selection of the
desired level of service and a contribution to the capital
costs is an indication of a long term demand to sustain the
facilities. For example, a project in Nepal requires the
community, in addition to contributing to capital costs, to
deposit one year of O&M costs in a bank account prior to
initiation of the project. However, it remains to be seen
whether communities do in fact assume their responsi-
bilities for O&M. Communities should be given the choice
to undertake management directly or obtain services
from others. Skills training and technical backstopping
should be provided.
Long term sustainability requires that rules be set to
address cost recovery and the financing of depreciation
and replacement. Despite that this is a critical element of
the financial policy, no surveyed project defined respon-
sibilities for full cost recovery, including the costs of
system replacement. However, the project in Bolivia moves
in that direction with rules requiring the government to
determine the financial policy for full cost recovery within
a year.
Conclusions and the learning agenda
There are major gains to be made in the quantity and
quality of service provided to low income communities
by moving toward demand-responsive delivery of serv-
ice. However, much remains to be learned about the rules
and processes which work best in different settings.
In the field, there should be  systematic monitoring of
project rules and procedures and their fine tuning when
required. At the global level, we should be facilitating
exchanges between countries and synthesizing results.
Some burning questions to be addressed include:
• What project rules would create the right incentives?
What level of payments and thresholds of financial
contribution reflect economic demand?  What techni-
cal options and what mix of services are the most
appropriate?  Are the rules conducive to providing
sustainable services based on what consumers want
and are willing to pay for?
• What information do communities need to make an
appropriate decision on the levels of service and or-
ganizational arrangements for implementation and
O&M?
• What types of incentives would reduce costs and lead
to efficiency in service delivery, including the costs of
intermediation?
The UNDP/World Bank Water and Sanitation Pro-
gram is continuously increasing its knowledge of what
works and does not work in RWSS. It is reaching out to
other partners in the sector to gain from their experiences
and applying its knowledge  to projects in urban and peri-
urban areas as well. The ultimate test of the approach will
be measurable improvements in water and sanitation
services for the unreached.
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